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Federal Taxation
by Robert Beard*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The past year saw few significant tax cases decided in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.' However, the court
did issue two interesting opinions: one dealing with the characterization
of a real estate developer's gain as ordinary income and another dealing
with a statutory interpretation question relating to the first-time
homebuyer tax credit. These two cases, both reversals of the United
States Tax Court, are discussed below.
II. REAL ESTATE DEVELOPER'S GAIN AS ORDINARY INCOME
In Long v. Commissioner,2 the taxpayer was an individual who owned
100% of the stock of Las Olas Tower Co., Inc. (LOT). LOT's primary
business activity was designing and developing a luxury, high-rise,
residential condominium building known as the Las Olas Tower. The
taxpayer consistently disregarded the existence of LOT by failing to file
tax returns for LOT and reporting all of its income on his personal
return.' The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) apparently acquiesced in
this treatment.4
The land on which the Las Olas Tower was to be constructed was
owned by the Las Olas Riverside Hotel (Hotel). In 2002, LOT and the
Hotel entered into an agreement (Purchase Agreement) for LOT to
purchase the land for a price of approximately $8.3 million with a

* Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University
(B.A., 2004); Georgetown University Law Center (J.D., 2007); University of Florida Frederic
G. Levin College of Law (LL.M., 2011). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of federal taxation cases decided during the prior survey period, see
Robert Beard, FederalTaxation, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 65 MERCER L. REV. 1013 (2014).
2. 772 F.3d 670 (11th Cir. 2014).
3. Id. at 672.
4. See id.
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closing date of December 31, 2014. After entering into the Purchase
Agreement, LOT began to develop the condominium project, including
developing construction plans, getting zoning approvals, and marketing
units to purchasers. 5
Subsequently, the Hotel, which was under new ownership, terminated
the Purchase Agreement. LOT promptly commenced litigation (Property
Litigation) to enforce the Purchase Agreement.6 In November 2005,
LOT obtained a judgment requiring the Hotel to consummate the sale
"within 326 days from the date of entry of the final judgment."7 The
Hotel was also required to pay monetary damages in an unspecified
amount.8 The Hotel appealed the judgment.'
During the pendency of the appeal, LOT entered into an agreement to
sell its position in the Property Litigation to Louis P. Ferris, Jr. Ferris
agreed to pay $5.75 million for the taxpayer's position as the plaintiff in
the Property Litigation. This sale was consummated in September 2006.
Ferris dismissed the lawsuit shortly after acquiring it. 10
The taxpayer was obligated to make payments of approximately $3.96
million to a lender and his ex-wife. He reported the remaining amount
received from the sale as ordinary income, but improperly omitted and
claimed a deduction for cost of goods sold of approximately $2.4 million.
The IRS asserted that the entire $5.75 million should have been reported
as gross receipts. The IRS also adjusted the claimed cost of goods sold.
In the tax court, the taxpayer asserted, among other claims, that the
character of his gain recognized should be capital and not ordinary."

5. Id. at 672, 673.
6. Id. at 673.
7.

Id.

8. Long v. Commissioner, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 409, 411 (2013).
9. Long, 772 F.3d at 673.
10. Long, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) at 412. One interesting facet of this case that was not
discussed by either court was the dismissal of the land sale litigation by the purchaser
shortly after the taxpayer sold its position in the case. See Case Docket, The Las Olas
Riverside Hotel Co. v. Ferris, No. 4005-827 (2006), availableat http://199.242.69.701/pls/ds/
dsdocket. A review of the public docket of The Las Olas Riverside Hotel v. Louis P.
Ferris, Jr., No. 4D05-4827, indicates that Ferris moved to voluntarily dismiss the litigation
immediately after he was substituted for LOT as the plaintiff-appellee. Id. The Broward
County land records (where the Hotel is located) do not indicate that the land was ever
transferred to a purchaser. See Official Records Search, BROWARD.ORG, www.broward.
org/recordstaxestreasury/recordspagespublicrecords-search.aspx (last visited Apr. 23,
2015). These facts raise the possibility that the payment from Ferris was in the nature of
a settlement of the lawsuit and not a purchase of the underlying right to acquire the
property.
11. Long, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) at 412. The taxpayer's other main claim in the tax court
was that a workout arrangement entered into with a lender should have been regarded as
a joint venture, with the result that some of the income earned with respect to the sale of
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Long-term capital gains received by non-corporate taxpayers are
subject to preferential tax rates. The Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.)
§ 1222(3)12 defines "long-term capital gain" as "gain from the sale or
exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year."13 Section
122114 defines the term "capital asset" as any property other than
certain excluded types of assets. 15 Section 1221(aXl) provides that
inventory and other "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business" (dealer
property) are not capital assets. 6 Gain from the sale of dealer property
is ordinary income. 7
Depreciable, non-inventory property used in a trade or business is also
excluded from the definition of capital assets, but § 12318 treats gain
from the sale of such property, under certain conditions, as long-term
capital gain unless the taxpayer has a net loss on such property for the
taxable year.19
Finally, gain from the sale of certain property that would otherwise be
classified as a capital asset can be treated as ordinary income if the
property represents a right to receive future ordinary income. 20 The
"substitute for ordinary income doctrine" was espoused in two United
States Supreme Court cases where taxpayers sold contractual rights to
receive ordinary income payments (in one case, payments under an
above-market lease, and in the other case, mineral royalty payments)
and claimed capital gain treatment. 21 A recent Eleventh Circuit
decision held that the substitute for ordinary income doctrine applies
where a payment is "essentially a substitute for what would otherwise
be received at a future time as ordinary income."2' 2

the interest in the property litigation should have been allocated to the lender. Id. at 413.
The tax court rejected this claim. Id. In the Eleventh Circuit, the taxpayer argued that
the payment made to the lender under the workout arrangement was a deductible expense.
Long, 772 F.3d at 674-75. This claim was also rejected. Id.
12. I.R.C. § 1222(3) (2012).
13. Id. Unless otherwise indicated, all "section" references are to sections of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the Code).
14. I.R.C. § 1221 (2012).
15. I.R.C. § 1221(a).
16. I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1).
17. See Long, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) at 415.
18. I.R.C. § 1231 (2012).
19. I.R.C. § 1231(a).
20. See Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 32-33 (1941).
21. See id.; Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 268 (1958).
22. Womack v. Commissioner, 510 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotingP.G. Lake,
356 U.S. at 265) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The scope of the definition of dealer property set forth in § 1221(a)(1)
has been the subject of exhaustive litigation and commentary. 2 One
context where issues frequently come up is real estate development.2 4
Developers who purchase tracts of land and subdivide it into individual
lots are often treated as dealers, as are condominium developers who
construct a condominium and sell units to residents.2
Ultimately, the question of whether property is dealer property is a
factual question that depends on a variety of factors.26 One commonly
cited list of factors identifies the following seven relevant criteria:
(1) the nature and purpose of the acquisition of the property and the
duration of the ownership; (2) the extent and nature of the taxpayer's
efforts to sell the property; (3) the number, extent, continuity and
substantiality of the sales; (4) the extent of subdividing, developing,
and advertising to increase sales; (5) the use of a business office for the
sale of the property; (6) the character and degree of supervision or
control exercised by the taxpayer over any representative selling the
property; and (7) the time and effort the taxpayer habitually devoted
to the sales.2 7
The facts of Long called for this dealer analysis to be applied in an
unusual context.28 Long recognized gain by selling an interest in
ongoing litigation, as opposed to real property.' Section 1221(aXl)
speaks of "property held... primarily for sale to customers. " In this
case, should the "property" described in § 1221(aX1) be the interest in
the litigation or the underlying property?
The tax court's opinion glosses over this issue, concluding with no
analysis that the character of the taxpayer's gain "depends upon whether
[the taxpayer] intended to acquire the Las Olas Boulevard property for
investment." 1 Thus, the court seems to have assumed that the
§ 1221(a)(1) test should be applied with respect to the underlying
property.3 2 The parties appear to have accepted this formulation in the

23. See, e.g., Womack, 510 F.3d at 1303-04.
24. See, e.g., Graves v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1989).
25. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 864, 865 (4th Cir. 1987).
26. See United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 910 (5th Cir. 1969).
27. Id. at 910; see also Case v. United States, 633 F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1980)
(offering a similar list of factors).
28. See Long, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) at 414-15.
29. Id. at 415.

30. I.R.C. § 1221(aX1).
31. Long, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) at 414.
32. Id.
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tax court proceedings, though they disagreed about what property the
taxpayer ultimately hoped to acquire.' s
The IRS took the position that the relevant property, which the
taxpayer was attempting to acquire, was the completed condominium
units in the fully constructed Las Olas Tower project. The taxpayer, on
the other hand, claimed that he intended to sell the land immediately
prior to commencing construction to another developer. For this reason,
the taxpayer claimed that the undeveloped land should be the relevant
property in the analysis. 34
The tax court accepted the taxpayer's argument and concluded that
the relevant question was whether the land itself would have been held
as a dealer asset if acquired by the taxpayer. 35 The court concluded
that it would have been dealer property.3" Several factors supported
this conclusion.37
According to the taxpayer's own testimony, his intention was to resell
the land after performing the preconstruction development work. The
taxpayer was engaged full-time in development work for the Las Olas
Tower project before the commencement of the Property Litigation. The
taxpayer arranged a number of presales of condominium units, and, even
after he decided to sell the land prior to beginning construction, the facts
indicated that he expected to make a profit primarily from his development efforts. The taxpayer, a full-time real estate developer, substantially improved the property and engaged in significant marketing
efforts.38
Based on these factors, the tax court agreed with the IRS and held
that 'the land would have been dealer property if it was acquired.39
Therefore, gain from the sale of the interest in the Property Litigation
was held to be ordinary income.4"
The taxpayer appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit ultimately reversed
the tax court on the capital gains issue.4 At the tax court level, the
IRS argued that the character of the taxpayer's gain should be determined by the taxpayer's purpose for holding the condominium units that
he intended to construct eventually. The taxpayer argued, and the tax
court agreed, that the character of the gain should be determined based
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 415.
See id. at 414.

38. Id. at 410, 414.

39. Id. at 415.
40. Id.
41. Long, 772 F.3d at 679.
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on the holding purposes for the unimproved land that the taxpayer
hoped to acquire.42
The Eleventh Circuit took a third view-that the relevant property
was the taxpayer's right, pursuant to the court's judgment, to purchase
the land for the Hotel in accordance with the terms of the Purchase
Agreement.4 3 Under this view, the only question was whether "Long
entered into the [Purchase Agreement] with the intent to assign his
contractual rights in the ordinary course of business. '
Clearly this
was not the case. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
taxpayer disposed of a capital asset when he sold his interest in the
litigation. 45
The Eleventh Circuit's approach focused on an important aspect of the
case that was glossed over by the tax court opinion.46 There is an
important qualitative difference between acquiring property and
acquiring a contingent interest in the Property Litigation that could
result in the eventual acquisition of such property.47 The Eleventh
Circuit was also correct to conclude that the taxpayer did not hold its
interest in the Property Litigation "primarily for sale [of the litigation]
to customers" as required by § 1221.48 Nevertheless, it seems equally
clear that the taxpayer did become the plaintiff in the Property
Litigation primarily for the purpose of acquiring land that would then
be subdivided and sold to customers in the ordinary course of his trade
or business.49 Should this fact mean that the interest in the Property
Litigation should have been treated as dealer property? The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that it should not, but its opinion gives the issue little
analysis.5 0
The IRS made two secondary arguments against treating the
taxpayer's gain as long-term capital gain.51 First, it argued that the
taxpayer's holding period in its right to purchase the land dated to
September 13, 2006, when the trial court issued its judgment in favor of
the taxpayer. Since that date was less than a year before the sale, the
IRS argued that any capital gain should be considered a short-term

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Long, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) at 414, 415.
Long, 772 F.3d at 676.
Id.
Id. at 677.
See id. at 676.
See id.
Id. at 675 (quoting I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1)).
See id. at 676.
See id.
Id. at 676-77.
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capital gain.52 The court rejected this argument, holding that the
taxpayer's holding period extended back to at least March 2004, when
back to 2002, when the
the lawsuit was initially filed, and possibly
53
Purchase Agreement was entered into.
The IRS's second argument was that the taxpayer's gain was a
"substitute for ordinary income" and should therefore be taxed as
The court held that the taxpayer's right to receive
ordinary income.
any income from the condominium project was too contingent for the sale
to be a substitute for ordinary income. 5 In the court's words, "Long's
rights in the [Hotel] property represented the potential to earn income
in the future based on the owner's actions in using it, not entitlement to
the income merely by owning the property."" The court's analysis of
this issue is persuasive. As the court noted, the substitute for ordinary
income doctrine is a judicial doctrine that is intended to apply when a
taxpayer monetizes a right to receive future income payments that have
more or less crystallized, though they may not have accrued under tax
accounting principles.57 The taxpayer in this case was very far from
receiving any actual income from the Las Olas Tower project because he
had not even acquired the land, let alone begun constructing the
condominium units that would eventually be sold.5"
III.

FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYER TAX CREDIT

In Packard v. Commissioner,59 the court dealt with a statutory
interpretation question relating to § 36 of the Code6 ° and its definition
of a "first-time homebuyer."6 ' Section 36 allowed for a credit of up to
$8000 for first-time homebuyers who purchased a primary residence
after April 9, 2008, and in most cases, prior to May 1, 2010.62 The
taxpayers, Robert Packard and Marianna Packard, were married on
November 22, 2008. Marianna Packard owned her principal residence
prior to the marriage and continued to own it through November 17,

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 676.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 677.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
746 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2014).
I.R.C. § 36 (2012).
Packard, 746 F.3d at 1220.
Id.; see also I.R.C. § 36.
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2009. Robert Packard rented his primary residence. On December 1,
2009, the Packards jointly purchased a new residence. 3
Section 36(a) allows first-time homebuyers a credit of 10% of the
purchase price of a principal residence."
Section 36(b) limits the
amount of the credit to $8000 in most cases, or $6500 in certain cases. 6
Section 36(c), which was at issue in this case, defines the term "firsttime homebuyer. '1 6 Under § 36(cX1), an individual is a first-time
homebuyer "if such individual (and if married, such individual's spouse)
had no present ownership interest in a principal residence during the 3year period ending on the date of the purchase of the principal residence
to which this section applies." 7
When the current § 36 was added to the Code in 2008, § 36(c)(1) was
the sole category of first-time homebuyers.68
With the Worker,
Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009,69 Congress
expanded the availability of the first-time homebuyer credit by adding
§ 36(c)(6) to the Code, permitting certain long-time residents to
qualify7 0 Under § 36(cX6),
[iun the case of an individual (and, if married, such individual's spouse)
who has owned and used the same residence as such individual's
principal residence for any 5-consecutive-year period during the 8-year
period ending on the date of the purchase of a subsequent principal
residence, such individual shall be treated as a first-time homebuyer71

Taxpayers who qualify as first-time homebuyers under § 36(c)(6) are
allowed a maximum credit of $6500.72
The Packards claimed a first-time homebuyer tax credit of $6500 on
their 2009 joint return. The IRS disallowed the credit. In the tax court,
the IRS argued that the taxpayers failed to satisfy either prong of the
definition of first-time homebuyer 3 The taxpayers were not first-time
homebuyers under § 36(c)(1) because Marianna Packard owned her
primary residence for most of the three-year period leading up to the

63. Packard v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. 390, 391 (2014).
64.

I.R.C. § 36(a).

65. I.R.C. § 36(bX1)(A)-(D).
66. I.R.C. § 36(c); see Packard,746 F.3d at 1220.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

I.R.C. § 36(cXl).
See Packard,139 T.C. at 392.
Pub. L. No. 111-92, 123 Stat. 2984 (2009).
Id. at § 11(b).
I.R.C. § 36(cX6).
I.R.C. § 36(bX1)(D).
Packard,139 T.C. at 391.
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couple's purchase of their new home.7 4 Likewise, the taxpayers were
not first-time homebuyers under § 36(c)(6) because Robert Packard did
not own his primary residence for any consecutive five-year period
during the eight-year period prior to the purchase of the new home.75
In essence, each taxpayer would have qualified under one prong or the
other, but taken together, they did not literally qualify under either.7"
The tax court concluded that Congress did not intend to require that
each spouse in a married couple qualify as a first-time homebuyer under
the same prong of § 36(c).77 The court interpreted § 36(c) in light of its
history." Congress originally adopted § 36(c)(1) and clearly intended
that both spouses would be required to satisfy § 36(cXl) in order to
qualify for the credit.79 When the Worker, Homeowner, and Business
Assistance Act of 2009 was passed, Congress intended, in the court's
view, to expand the definition of first-time homebuyers to include longterm residents, but still require that both spouses satisfy one of the two
prongs of § 36(c)." ° To achieve this end, Congress borrowed the "and,
if married, such individual's spouse" parenthetical from § 36(c)(1) and
added it to § 36(c)(6)."1 The tax court concluded that reading this
parenthetical to require both spouses to qualify under the same prong
would be contrary to the intent of Congress and "absurd.8 2
The IRS appealed the tax court's decision. The taxpayers, who were
represented pro se in the tax court, did not participate in oral arguments
or file a brief in the appeal.' The Eleventh Circuit took a more literal
approach to interpreting § 36(c)." The court concluded, quoting the
United States Supreme Court's opinion, BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United
States,85 that the inquiry should "[begin] with the statutory text, and
[end] there as well if the text is unambiguous. ' 8 Applying this
standard, the court had little trouble concluding that § 36(c) unambiguously required both spouses of a married couple to satisfy the same

74.

See id. at 392.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See id.
See Packard,139 T.C. at 393.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 394.
Id.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 394-95 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also I.R.C. § 36(cX6).
Packard, 139 T.C. at 394.
Packard, 746 F.3d at 1221.
Id. at 1222.
541 U.S. 176 (2004).
Packard,746 F.3d at 1222 (quoting BedRoc Ltd., LLC, 541 U.S. at 183).
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prong of § 36(c) to qualify as first-time homebuyers.87 The Eleventh
Circuit also dismissed the tax court's conclusion that the outcome would
be "absurd," stating,
Here, the plain language in [§ 36(c) of the Code] makes clear Congress's intent to treat married couples as a single inseparable unit for
purposes of determining first-time homebuyer eligibility. While the
effect of enforcing the statute as written may seem inequitable in light
of the facts of this case, it does not shock general moral or common
sense.8
The Eleventh Circuit accordingly reversed the tax court's decision.'
The subject matter of Packard is of little practical interest, as the
first-time homebuyer tax credit has now expired, but the approach taken
by the two courts provides useful guidance for tax practitioners
interpreting tax statutes. In interpreting the language of § 36(c), the tax
court paid close attention to its understanding of the congressional
intent behind the statutory language and, arguably, showed itself willing
to strain the literal language of the statute to ensure that that intent
was achieved.9" In stark contrast, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
idea that a court should look beyond the language of a statute to infer
congressional intent, unless the language is ambiguous or its literal
interpretation "shocks the general moral or common sense."9 1 The
Eleventh Circuit's analysis in this case should be considered as a
cautionary note before concluding that a counterintuitive, but literally
unambiguous, provision can be disregarded as a statutory "glitch," even
if there is evidence that the glitch was not intended.

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1222-23.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1223.
See Packard,139 T.C. at 394-95.

91. Packard,746 F.3d at 1222.

